HA 645 Unit 4 safety event review example

Quality Improvement and Patient Safety in Healthcare Herzing University Free custom sample in 24 to 48h

This HA 645 Unit 4 safety event review example examines how a 9-millimeter lung nodule in a final radiology report never reached the patient, whose discharge summary showed a negative scan. Herzing HA 645 has MS in Healthcare Administration students analyze an event as a system failure, and this sample describes the event first: a 58-year-old seen overnight at Northfield in March 2023 for chest pain, sent home on a preliminary read. A timed sequence runs from arrival at 11:52 p.m. to the final report the next morning. Six defenses are examined one at a time, including those that worked, such as the radiologist's clear recommendation. Five contributing conditions are described as properties of the system, such as a worklist that compares only the primary finding. Corrective actions are ordered strongest first, from a required structured statement to tracking, before weaker reminders. About 1,050 words.

CourseHA 645 Quality Improvement and Patient Safety in Healthcare
UnitUnit 4
Paper typeSafety event review
LengthAbout 1,020 words, 6 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolHerzing University
ProgramMS in Healthcare Administration
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for HA 645 Unit 4

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A Nine-Millimeter Nodule in the Final Report, a Negative Scan in the Discharge Summary: A Safety Event Review of a Follow-Up That Never Happened

Student Name

Health Care Administration, Herzing University

HA 645: Quality Improvement and Patient Safety in Healthcare

Instructor Name

February 5, 2026

What this page is doingThe title sets the two documents that disagreed beside each other. The whole event turns on that gap, and naming it in the title keeps the review on the system rather than on any person.
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A Nine-Millimeter Nodule in the Final Report, a Negative Scan in the Discharge Summary: A Safety Event Review of a Follow-Up That Never Happened

The Event

A 58-year-old patient came to Northfield's emergency department overnight in March 2023 with chest pain and shortness of breath. A CT pulmonary angiogram showed no pulmonary embolism. The final radiology report, issued the next morning after the patient had gone home, also described a 9-millimeter solid nodule in the right upper lobe and recommended further evaluation within three months, consistent with national guidelines for a solid nodule of that size in a patient of that age (MacMahon et al., 2017). No one acted on the recommendation. Fifteen months later, the patient returned with coughing up blood; imaging showed a 2.8-centimeter mass, and the diagnosis was stage IIIA lung adenocarcinoma. Northfield rated the harm severe and filed a serious event report with the state. People are described by role only. This review was written with the emergency department, radiology and nursing staff who were involved, and they reviewed it before it was finalized.

Sequence

March 11, 2023, 11:52 p.m.: patient arrives; chest pain protocol. March 12, 12:40 a.m.: CT pulmonary angiogram performed. 1:25 a.m.: overnight teleradiology preliminary read: "No pulmonary embolism." Preliminary reads at night address the question asked and do not routinely describe incidental findings. 1:58 a.m.: emergency physician reviews preliminary read and troponin results; discharge decision. 2:14 a.m.: patient discharged with instructions to see a primary care physician; the discharge summary, generated automatically, lists the CT result as the preliminary impression. The patient's record lists no primary care physician. 7:40 a.m.: the Northfield radiologist finalizes the report; impression item 1, no pulmonary embolism; item 2, 9-millimeter right upper lobe nodule, recommend evaluation within three months. 7:41 a.m.: a "final report available" item enters the emergency department callback worklist. 9:10 a.m.: the callback nurse closes the item with the note "no change in PE result." March 15: the final report is released to the patient portal; the portal shows the patient never logged in. June 2024: patient returns with hemoptysis; the mass is found.

Defenses, One at a Time

Six defenses stood between the nodule and a missed follow-up. Each is examined, including those that worked.

The final radiology report worked: the radiologist found the nodule and wrote a clear recommendation. It was placed in the impression, where it should be. But it was written as free text, not with the structured incidental-finding statement, so it did not enter any tracking list.

The preliminary read did not fail; it was not designed to report incidental findings. The gap it created, between what the emergency team knew at discharge and what the final report said, is a design feature of overnight coverage.

The callback worklist fired and was overridden. The item reached the callback nurse, who had 64 worklist items that morning. The worklist design shows only whether the "primary finding" changed between preliminary and final reports, and the primary finding, no embolism, had not changed. Closing the item was consistent with how the worklist presents information and how nurses had been taught to use it.

The discharge summary did not carry the final report. It was built at discharge from the preliminary impression and was not updated when the final report arrived. Even if the patient had given it to a physician, it would have said the scan was negative.

Portal release worked as designed and depended on the patient logging in, which the patient did not do.

Primary care follow-up did not exist. The patient had no primary care physician, and no one at Northfield was assigned to find one or to track the recommendation for patients without one.

What this page is doingEach defense is examined separately, including the one that fired and was overridden. That shows where the event passed through and why, rather than stopping at the last person who could have caught it.
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Contributing Conditions as Properties of the System

The review found five conditions, each a property of how the work is set up. A preliminary-to-final gap overnight, during which patients are discharged on preliminary results. A worklist that compares only the primary finding, so an added incidental finding looks like no change. Worklist volume that makes line-by-line reading of every final report unrealistic in the time available. A discharge summary that is generated once and never updated. And no owner for follow-up recommendations for patients without a primary care physician. None of these conditions depended on one person's carelessness. Harm occurred because gaps in several defenses lined up on the same patient on the same morning, the pattern long described in safety science as holes in successive layers of defense lining up (Reason, 2000).

Corrective Actions, Strongest First

Actions are ordered by how much they rely on memory and vigilance, from those that change the system so the failure is hard to repeat, down to those that ask people to be more careful (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015).

Stronger. 1. Require the structured incidental-finding statement for any nodule needing follow-up: the reporting system will not allow a chest CT report to be finalized with the word nodule in the impression unless the structured statement is completed. Owner: chair of radiology. Date: June 30, 2026. 2. Route every structured incidental finding to a nurse navigator's tracking list, independent of the emergency department worklist, with the navigator responsible until follow-up is done or documented as refused. Owner: director of imaging services. Date: July 31, 2026.

Intermediate. 3. Redesign the callback worklist to flag any new impression item, not only a change in the primary finding. Owner: emergency department medical director with information services. Date: May 31, 2026. 4. Regenerate the discharge summary and send an amended copy when a final report adds an impression item after discharge. Owner: chief medical information officer. Date: September 30, 2026.

Weaker. 5. Educate emergency and callback nursing staff on incidental findings and the new worklist. Owner: emergency department nurse educator. Date: within 30 days of action 3. This action is listed last because, on its own, it would ask the same people to catch the same problem with the same tools.

The patient and family were informed of the review's findings in writing, as Pennsylvania law requires for serious events, and met with the chief medical officer.

References

MacMahon, H., Naidich, D. P., Goo, J. M., Lee, K. S., Leung, A. N. C., Mayo, J. R., Mehta, A. C., Ohno, Y., Powell, C. A., Prokop, M., Rubin, G. D., Schaefer-Prokop, C. M., Travis, W. D., Van Schil, P. E., & Bankier, A. A. (2017). Guidelines for management of incidental pulmonary nodules detected on CT images: From the Fleischner Society 2017. Radiology, 284(1), 228-243. https://doi.org/10.1148/radiol.2017161659

National Patient Safety Foundation. (2015). RCA2: Improving root cause analyses and actions to prevent harm.

Reason, J. (2000). Human error: Models and management. BMJ, 320(7237), 768-770. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768

Reading the HA 645 Unit 4 instructions

Unit 4 asks you to review a safety event and recommend corrective actions. Expect to describe the event, set out the sequence with times, examine each defense, identify contributing conditions as system properties and rank corrective actions by strength. Students often ask how to avoid blaming individuals. Describe conditions as features of how work is set up, such as a gap between preliminary and final reads, rather than as someone's mistake. Examine defenses that worked as well as those that failed. Use a timeline with exact times. Rank actions by how little they depend on memory and vigilance, putting forcing functions and automation above training and reminders. Give each action an owner and a measure.

Inside the HA 645 Unit 4 example

The review opens with the patient, the visit and the missed nodule. A timeline lists each step from arrival to the final report with times and who acted. The defenses section takes the final report, the worklist that flags changed reads, the discharge summary, the primary care letter, the patient portal and the follow-up registry in turn, noting where each worked or failed. The conditions section names five system properties, from discharge on preliminary reads to worklist volume. The actions section lists stronger fixes first, such as a required structured statement and automatic tracking, then intermediate steps, then weaker ones like education. Each action names an owner and a measure linked to the Unit 2 specification.

HA 645 Unit 4 rubric: what full points look like

Herzing's rubric for a safety event review typically covers the event, sequence, defenses, contributing conditions and corrective actions. Ranking corrective actions by strength draws the most points, because the purpose of a review is to make the failure hard to repeat, not to remind people to be careful. Event points reward facts without blame. Sequence criteria look for exact times and actors. Defense credit goes to examining each barrier, including those that held. Condition points reward system properties rather than individual errors. Actions should have owners and measures. Reason's model of human error, the RCA2 guidance from the National Patient Safety Foundation and the Fleischner guidelines support the review.

HA 645 Unit 4 help before you submit

Event reviews in HA 645 Unit 4 commonly lose points by concluding that someone should have been more careful. Another frequent problem is a timeline without exact times. Students often skip the defenses that worked. Contributing conditions are stated as individual errors. Corrective actions are mostly training and reminders. Actions have no owner or measure. The link to measurement is missing, so no one can tell if the fix worked. The patient's experience is not described. Finally, rank actions by how little they rely on memory, because graders favor a review whose fixes would still work on a busy night with tired staff.

Get a HA 645 Unit 4 example written to your instructions

Send the Unit 4 instructions and the rubric from your HA 645 classroom, plus a de-identified outline of the event your review has to cover. We write a custom example with the sequence timed, the failed defenses sorted and corrective actions ranked by strength, returned in 24 to 48 hours. Internal investigation files stay out of it. The first custom sample is free.

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HA 645 Unit 4 questions, answered

How is this different from a review my employer would run?

The reasoning overlaps; the document does not. What an organization runs after a serious event is a protected internal process with a chartered team and binding actions, and its file is not something to quote or reproduce. Your submission is academic work: one writer, published safety evidence, an event described without identifying detail, and recommendations argued rather than authorized.

Can I write about a real event I know of?

In many sections yes, provided the instructions allow it and every identifying detail is stripped, including the department, the dates and anything that would let a reader place it. Do not copy from an internal report or a peer-protected file. Describe it yourself, keeping to what each role did and when they did it, which is everything the review needs.

What if nobody knows exactly why it happened?

Then say so and reason from what the record supports. A review offering two candidate mechanisms, weighing them against the sequence and stating which evidence would settle the question reads as competent, where a cause asserted to close the section reads as invention. Incomplete information is normal after an event, and treating the gap openly is scored as analysis rather than as weakness.

Where can I find a free HA 645 Unit 4 sample paper?

Read the complete HA 645 Unit 4 safety event review here at no charge, a missed lung nodule follow-up with a timeline, defenses and ranked corrective actions. Ask for a custom review of another event.

What are strong corrective actions in patient safety?

Actions that change the system so a failure is hard to repeat, such as forcing functions, standardization and automation, rather than training or reminders. This sample ranks actions that way.